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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-Is EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROPOR­
TIONALITY ApPLICABLE TO MERE LENGTH OF SENTENCE? RUMMEL 
v. ESTELLE, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In January 1973, a Texas grand jury indicted William Rummel 
for the felony offense l of obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses.2 
The indictment also cited him for two prior felony convictions.3 The 
prosecution chose to proceed against Rummel under the Texas re­
cidivist statute.4 The. indictment cited his 1964 and 1969 convictions 
as mandating imposition of a life sentence if Rummel was convicted 
of a third felony offense.s A jury found Rummel guilty of the false 
pretenses offense. The state also proved Rummel's two prior convic­
tions. As a result, the trial court sentenced Rummel to life imprison­
1. In 1973, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1421 (Vernon 1953) (current version at 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 31.03 (Vernon Cum. 1980» provided: "Theft of prop­
erty of the value of fifty dollars or over shall be punished by confinement in the peniten­
tiary not less than two nor more than ten years." 
2. In 1973, TEX. PENAL COD~ ANN. art. 1410 (Vernon 1925) (current version at 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 33.03 (Vernon Cum. 1980» provided: 
Theft is the fraudulent taking of corporeal personal property belonging to an­
other from his possession, or from the possession of some person holding the 
same for him, without his consent, with intent to deprive the owner of the value 
of the same, and to appropriate it to the use or benefit of the person taking. 
In 1973, TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1413 (Vernon 1953) (current version at TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 31.03 (Vernon Cum. 1980» provided: 
The taking must be wrongful, so that if the property came into the possession of 
the person accused of theft by lawful means, the subsequent appropriation of it 
is not theft, but if the taking, though originally lawful was obtained by false 
pretext, or with any intent to deprive the owner of the value thereof, and appro­
priate the property to the use and benefit of the person taking, and the same is 
so appropriated, the offense of theft is complete. 
3. Rummel was convicted in 1964 of the fraudulent use of a credit card to obtain 
$80 worth of goods or services pursuant to TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1555(b)(4)(d) 
(Vernon Supp. 1973) (current version at TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 32.31 (Vernon 
1974». In 1969 Rummel was convicted of passing a forged check in the amount of 
$28.36 pursuant to TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 996 (Vernon 1961) (current version at 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 32.21 (Vernon 1974». 
4. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 63 (Vernon 1925) (current version at TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974» provided: "Whoever shall have been three 
times convicted of a felony less than capital shall on such third conviction be imprisoned 
for life in the penitentiary." 
5. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 266 (1980). 
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ment as mandated under the Texas statute.6 On appeal, the Texas 
Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed Rummel's conviction.7 In Rum­
mel v. Estelle,8 defendant turned to the federal courts for relief. 
Rummel filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, 
claiming that his life sentence was so disproportionate to the crime 
committed that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment prohib­
ited by the eighth amendment. Rummel's petition was denied with­
out hearing. A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit reversed.9 The panel opinion, citing Weems v. 
United States 10 and Ingraham v. Wright, II noted that while the 
Supreme Court has yet to hold a sentence cruel and unusual due to 
length of sentence alone, the eighth amendment extends to the pro­
scription of a punishment that is grossly disproportionate to the se­
verity of the crime. 12 The panel therefore concluded that imposition 
of a life sentence for Rummel's three offenses would constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment. 13 
Rummel's appeal was reheard by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
sitting en bane. By an eight-to-six majority, the en bane court va­
cated the panel opinion and affirmed the district court's denial of 
Rummel's eighth amendment claim.14 Eight years after Rummel 
committed the false pretenses offense, the United States Supreme 
Court held that the mandatory life sentence imposed upon Rummel 
did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. IS The Court ac­
knowledged that, historically, courts have viewed criminal sentences 
with regard to the severity of the crimes committed to determine if 
the sentence was constitutionally acceptable. The actual circum­
stances present m those prior cases, however, were distinguished 
6. Id. 
7. Rummel v. State, 509 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). 
8. 568 F.2d 1193, 1200 (5th Cir.), rev'd and remanded with directions, 587 F.2d 651 
(5th Cir. 1978) (en bane), qffd in part, remanded in part, 590 F.2d 103 (5th Cir. 1979), 
vacated in part and remanded, 498 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Tex.), qffd, 445 U.S. 263 (1980). 
9. Id. at 1200, 1203. 
10. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
II. 430 U.S. 651 (1977). 
12. 568 F.2d at 1195. 
13. Id. at 1200. 
14. 587 F.2d at 662. While the analysis implemented by the en bane majority was 
similar to the analysis used by the panel, its ultimate disagreement with the panel opin­
ion was the panel's failure to uphold Rummel's sentence if it had any rational basis. Id. 
at 655-56. 
15. 445 U.S. at 285. 
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from the case at bar. 16 The Court also considered Rummel's possi­
bility of parole as relevant to a realistic assessment of the gravity of 
his sentenceP The questions of whether the Court actually did ap­
ply a form of a proportionality analysis in evaluating Rummel's sen­
tence, or whether a proportionality approach is at all a viable form 
of analysis to evaluate mere length of a sentence, were not clearly 
addressed. Rummel is better understood through a brief analysis of 
habitual offender statutes and the historical parameters of the eighth 
amendment. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. The Supreme Court and Proportionality 
Rummel did not challenge the general constitutionality of the 
Texas recidivist statute but only its constitutionality as applied to the 
facts of his case. IS This tactical approach was taken because it has 
been well established, since Spencer v. Texas, 19 that recidivist stat­
utes no longer are open to general eighth amendment challenges.2o 
Mandatory life imprisonment statutes have been upheld because 
courts have recognized that a state has a valid interest in dealing in a 
harsher manner with those who, by repeated criminal acts, have 
shown an inability to conform to the norms of society as enforced by 
its criminallaws.21 
Rummel maintained that section 12.42(d) of the Texas Penal 
Code22 should not be applied to the facts of his case.23 Rummel 
sought a ruling by the Court that his life sentence was so dispropor­
tionate to the crimes he had committed that it constituted cruel and 
unusual punishment.24 To succeed on this challenge, it was neces­
sary for Rummel to convince the Court that a proportionality analy­
16. Id. at 271-74; see text accompanying notes 130-37 infra. 
17. 445 U.S. at 280-81. For a cogent discussion of parole and parole trends, see 
Chitra, Modern Trends On Parole Granting 1957-1976,5 QUEENS L.J. 46 (1980). 
18. 445 U.S. at 268. 
19. 385 U.S. 554 (1967). 
20. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962). These recidivist statutes generally are im­
mune to other constitutional attacks. Note, A Closer Look at Habitual Criminal Statutes 
Brown v. Parratt and Martin v. Parratt, A Case Studyojtlze Nebraska Low, 16 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 275, 282-84 (1978). 
21. 445 U.S. at 276. Deterrence and social protection are the usual justifications 
for life sentences under the statute. Katkin, Habitual Olfonder Law: A Reconsideration, 
21 BUFFALO L. REV. 99, 103 (1971). 
22. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 63 (Vernon 1925) (current version at TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974». 
23. 445 U.S. at 268. 
24. Id. at 265. 
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sis was applicable: The Court should evaluate the relative severity of 
Rummel's crimes in relation to the length of his sentence.25 The 
Supreme Court has never found a sentence imposed in a criminal 
case to violate the eighth amendment merely because of length of 
incarceration.26 There is substantial case law, however, that can be 
interpreted to support Rummel's claim. 
The proportionality concept first was enunciated in Justice 
Field's dissent to O'Neil v. Vermont. 27 This 1892 case involved a 
fifty-four year sentence imposed upon O'Neil following his convic­
tion of307 separate offenses for the illegal sale ofliquor.28 While the 
majority opinion refused to address the eighth amendment issue on 
procedural grounds,29 Justice Field's dissent asserted that the eighth 
amendment extends to "all punishments which by their excessive 
length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences 
charged."30 
Justice Field's words later were quoted to support the majority 
holding in Weems v. United States.3l In that landmark decision the 
Supreme Court declared a punishment cruel and unusual under the 
eighth amendment.32 Weems, a United States government official in 
the Philippine Islands, was convicted of falsifying official docu­
ments.33 The punishment for this crime was known as "cadena tem­
poral."34 "Cadena temporaf' consisted of imprisonment in chains at 
hard and laborous work for a minimum of twelve years.35 In addi­
tion, restrictions were imposed on a person's marital authority, pa­
rental rights, and property rights during such imprisonment.36 
Following the felon's term of imprisonment, he forever was unable 
25. For a detailed discussion of eighth amendment proportionality, see Clapp, 
Eighth Amendment Proportionality, 7 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 253 (1979). 
26. See Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405, 408 (2d Cir. 1978); Downey v. Perini, 518 
F.2d. 1288, 1290 (6th Cir. 1975); Note, Constitutional Law-Cruel and Unusual Punish­
ments-Eighth Amendment Prohibits Excessively Long Sentences, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 
637, 644 (1975). 
27. 144 U.S. 323 (1892). 
28. Id. at 327-30. 
29. The O'Neil majority never reached the issue of proportionality because the 
case was dismissed for lack of a federal question. Id. at 331, 334-35. 
30. Id. at 339-40 (Field, J., dissenting). 
31. 217 U.S. 349 (1910). 
32. Id. at 382. See generally Turkington, Unconstitutionally Excessive Punishments: 
An Examination ofthe Eighth Amendment and the Weems Principle, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 145 
(1967). 
33. 217 U.S. at 357-58. 
34. Id. at 363. 
35. Id. at 366. 
36. Id. 
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to change his domicile without written permission from the criminal 
magistrate.37 The Court found "cadena temporar' to be an extreme 
form of incarceration and therefore unconstitutional, both because 
of the length of the sentence and the intensity of the punishment. 38 
The Court reached its result through use of a two-tiered approach to 
proportionality. First, the Court compared Weems' punishment to 
punishments levied in the United States for crimes such as inciting 
rebellion, misprision of treason, conspiracy, forgery, and larceny. 
While these offenses were similar to the offense for which Weems 
was convicted, the Court noted that the punishments levied were far 
less severe than "cadena temporal."39 Second, the Court compared 
Weems' punishment to the Philippine punishment of "cadena 
perpetua ," which was imposed for falsification of bank notes and 
other instruments. The Court found that Weems' sentence was ex­
cessive when compared with the punishment of "cadena perpetua ," 
which the Court felt was of a far graver nature than merely falsifying 
a single item of a public account.40 
Six years later, the comparison approach utilized in Weems was 
limited severely when the Court summarily refused to allow a pro­
portionality challenge in Badders v. United States.41 Badders en­
dorsed a doctrine stated in Howard v. Fleming:42 A punishment is 
not rendered cruel and unusual simply because other more serious 
offenses receive lesser penalties.43 This approach, implemented in 
Badders, has never been reconciled with Weems. 
It was not until 1958 that the Court, in Trop v. Dul/es,44 once 
again found that a punishment violated the eighth amendment.45 
The punishment under scrutiny was denationalization after a court­
marital for wartime desertion.46 Mter an historical overview of the 
eighth amendment, the Court, citing Weems, stated that the meaning 
and exact scope of the eighth amendment are neither precise nor 
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 380-82. 
39. Id. at 380. 
40. Id. at 380-81. 
41. 240 U.S. 391 (1916). See Note, Revival ofthe Eighth Amendment: Development 
ofthe Cruel-Punishment Doctrine by the Supreme Court, 16 STAN. L. REV. 996, 1008-09. 
(1964). 
42. 191 U.S. 126 (1903). 
43. 240 U.S. at 394. 
44. 356 U.S. 86 (1958). 
45. Id. at 101. 
46. Id. at 88-91. 
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static.47 While Trop did not deal directly with proportionality, the 
Court implied that eighth amendment analyses should focus on con­
cepts of human dignity and evolving standards of decency.48 With 
this in mind, the scope of the amendment was viewed in a flexible 
manner. The amendment's meaning was found to be subject to ad­
justment according to the changing conditions and attitudes of 
society.49 
In Robinson v. California,50 decided in 1962, the Court held un­
constitutional a state statute that made narcotics addiction a criminal 
offense.51 The Court reasoned that the length of the sentence under 
the statute could not be considered in the abstract, but must be con­
sidered in relation to the offense for which the statute dictates pun­
ishment.52 It was pointed out that one day in prison would be cruel 
and unusual punishment for the crime of having a common cold.53 
This approach, which requires the length of the sentence to conform 
to the nature of the crime, is another formulation of the proportion­
ality analysis. 
The next comprehensive look at the eighth amendment prohibi­
tion against cruel and unusual punishment came in the death penalty 
cases of the 1970's. The first of these cases was Furman v. Georgia.54 
The Court rendered nine separate opinions in Furman,55 thus ham­
pering its value as a guide in subsequent cases. Justice Brennan's 
concurring opinion, however, is worthy of comment. Justice Bren­
nan recognized that the determination that a punishment is excessive 
may be derived from a judgment that the punishment is dispropor­
tionate to the crime. 56 In conjunction with this determination, Jus­
tice Brennan recognized four principles with which to test the 
47. Id. at 99-101. See generally Note, Constitutional Law-Eighth Amendment­
Appellate Sentence Review, 1976 WIS. L. REV. 655. 
48. 356 U.S. at 100-01. See Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments In­
flicted:" The Original Meaning, 57 CAL. L. REV. 839 (1969). 
49. 356 U.S. at 100-01. The majority determined that a punishment making an 
individual "stateless" has grave and disastrous consequences. Id. at 102-03. 
50. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). 
51. Id. at 667. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. This example was used by the majority to exemplify the caveat that eighth 
.amendment determinations should not be made in the abstract.ld. 
54. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
55. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall filed separate concur­
ring opinions. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist filed 
separate dissenting opinions. Id. at 240. 
56. Id. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring). For a critique of Justice Brennan's con­
currence in Furman, see Wheeler, Toward a Theory ofLimited Punishment II: The Eighth 
Amendment After Furman v. Georgia, 25 STAN. L. REV. 62 (1972). 
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constitutionality of a specific punishment under the eighth amend­
ment.57 Use of these four objective criteria to evaluate a sentence's 
proportionality to the crime is designed to protect individuals from 
overtly abstract or subjective judgments by the courts. The criteria 
later were discussed by the Court in Gregg v. Georgia,58 the next case 
in the Court's examination of the death penalty. 
Gregg presented the Court with the question: Is the death pen­
alty cruel and unusual per se under the eighth amendment?59 The 
Court held that the death penalty was not necessarily a cruel and 
unusual form of punishment.60 The plurality opinion of Justices 
Stewart, Powell, and Stevens is of special significance because the 
Justices delineated what they considered to be the relevant inquiries 
when evaluating a punishment under the eighth amendment. After 
reviewing Weems, Trop, and Robinson, and Justice Brennan's four 
objective criteria in Furman ,61 the plurality stated that, to withstand 
eighth amendment scrutiny, a punishment must not involve the un­
necessary and wanton infliction of pain and must not be grossly dis­
proportionate to the severity of the crime.62 This later consideration, 
regarding the punishment's relative proportionality, was extended 
one step further in Coker v. Georgia.63 . 
Coker is the most recent Supreme Court case to scrutinize the 
issue of proportionality under the eighth amendment. The Court 
held that "a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and exces­
sive punishment for the crime of rape and is therefore forbidden by 
the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment."64 Citing 
Gregg, the Court acknowledged that apunishment is excessive and 
unconstitutional if it is grossly out of proportion to the severity of the 
crime.65 In making a determination of disproportionality, the Court 
57. Justice Brennan's criteria were fourfold: (I) The punishment must not by its 
severity be degrading to human dignity; (2) the punishment must not be inflicted arbi­
trarily; (3) the punishment violates the eighth amendment if it clearly and totally is re­
jected throughout society; (4) the punishment is unacceptable if it clearly is unnecessary 
to achieve legislative aims. 408 U.S. at 281. 
58. 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
59. Id. at 168. 
60. Id. at 207. 
61. Id. at 171-76. 
62. Id. at 173. For a good discussion of how the standards in Gregg were formu­
lated, see Note, Gregg v. Georgia: The Search/or the Civilized Standard 1976 DET. C.L. 
REV. 645. 
63. 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
64. Id. at 592. See generally Note, Coker v. Georgia: Disproportionate Punishment 
and The Death Penalty For Rape, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1714 (1978). 
65. 433 U.S. at 592. 
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compared the Georgia rape statute to other states' rape legislation, 
noting that Georgia alone authorized a death sentence when an 
adult woman is the rape victim.66 The Court also examined the na­
ture of the crime of rape, as compared to murder, and concluded that 
its relative lack of severity did not warrant the taking of a human life 
as punishment.67 
While the Supreme Court never has found a sentence imposed 
in a criminal case to violate the eighth amendment merely because of 
its length,68 the cases discussed above demonstrate that the concept 
of proportionality is embedded firmly in eighth amendment analy­
sis.69 Rummel provided an excellent opportunity for the Court to 
deal with this novel issue and to extend proportionality analysis in 
evaluating the constitutional propriety of Rummel's life sentence. 
The opinion, however, does not provide a clear indication of the 
Court's intent to expand the proportionality analysis. 
B. Circuit Courts and Proportionality 
Two circuit court cases that are factually analogous to Rummel, 
but followed a different mode of eighth amendment analysis, are 
Hart v. Coiner7o and Carmona v. Ward.1 1 These opinions are note­
worthy because of the refusal by the Rummel majority to adopt a 
Hart or Carmona analysis in its eighth amendment scrutiny. 
In 1949, Hart was convicted of writing a bad check and, in 1955, 
he was convicted of transporting forged checks across state lines. 72 
Upon Hart's 1968 conviction for perjury, he received a mandatory 
life sentence under West Virginia's habitual offender statute,73 a law 
that, like the Texas statute under which Rummel was convicted, 
mandates a life sentence upon conviction of a third felony. The 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found the 
mandatory life sentence to be an unconstitutionally disproportionate 
66. Id. at 595-96. 
67. Id. at 598. 
68. The Court arrived at this determination by distinguishing the unique nature of 
the punishments considered in Weems and the death penalty cases. 445 U.S. at 272-74. 
69. After reviewing the relevant cases, Justice Powell expounded this premise. Id. 
at 293 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall & Stewart, JJ.). 
70. 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973). 
71. 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978). 
72. 483 F.2d at 140. 
73. W. VA. CODE § 61-11-18 (1966) states in relevant part U[w]hen it is determined, 
as provided in section nineteen hereof, that such person shall have been twice before 
convicted in the United States of a crime punishable by confinement in a penitentiary the 
person shall be sentenced to be confined in the penitentiary for life." Id. 
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punishment for the three, nonviolent felonies committed by Hart.74 
In arriving at its holding, the Fourth Circuit cited Justice Field's dis­
sent in O'NeiPs and the majority opinions in Weems76 and 
Furman ,77 and stated that proportionality is a well fortified eighth 
amendment concept,18 The court established that Hart's sentence 
must be constitutionally proportionate to his offense and proceeded 
to delineate four, objective criteria for evaluating Hart's sentence.79 
The criteria, extracted from Weems and from Justice Brennan's con­
currence in Furman were: (I) The nature of the offense; (2) whether 
the sentence was necessary to accomplish the legislature's purposes; 
(3) the punishment imposed for the crime in other jurisdictions; and 
(4) the punishments imposed for other crimes in the same 
jurisdiction.80 
Carmona did not involve a recidivist statute. Defendants Car­
mona and Fowler each were sentenced to life imprisonment for the 
sale of narcotics.8l The United States Court of Appeals for the Sec­
ond Circuit upheld both life sentences but recognized that a propor­
tionality analysis, in certain circumstances, could invalidate a 
sentence solely because of its length.82 The Second Circuit em­
ployed three of the four factors enumerated in Hart. 83 The court 
eliminated the Hart criterion that examines whether a sentence is 
penologically "necessary."84 This criterion was eliminated as a re­
sult of the extreme deference that the Second Circuit emphasized 
should be given to the legislature in fixing criminal sentences.8S This 
consideration may be one reason why the Rummel majority refused 
to evaluate the constitutionality of Rummel's sentence. 
74. 483 F.2d at 143. 
75. See text accompanying notes 27-30 supra. 
76. See text accompanying notes 31-40 supra. 
77. See text accompanying notes 54-57 supra. 
78. 483 F.2d at 139-40. For a tracing of the proportionality analysis, see Mulligan, 
Cruel and Unusual Punishments: The Proportionality Rule, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 639 
(1979). 
79. 483 F.2d at 139-40. 
80. Id. at 140-42. 
81. 576 F.2d at 407-09. The Second Circuit did not conclude that the proportional­
ity analysis articulated in the death penalty cases was unique to capital punishment cases. 
See also Downey v. Perini, 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1975). 
82. 576 F.2d at 409. 
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 415-16. For a discussion concerning the reluctance of courts to disrupt 
legislatively prescribed punishments, see Comment, Recidivist Statutes and the Eighth 
Amendment; A Disproportiona/ityAnalysis, 1974 WASH. U.L.Q. 147, 149. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF FIFTH CIRCUIT AND UNITED STATES 

SUPREME COURT OPINIONS 

A divided panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit held Rummel's life sentence to be cruel and unusual 
under the eighth amendment and, in doing so, recognized the viabil­
ity of proportionality analysis.86 The panel opinion applied the four 
Hart criteria in assessing Rummel's sentence.87 The panel majority 
felt that the objective criteria used in Hart were extracted properly 
from the Supreme Court's decisions in Coker, Weems, Trop, Gregg, 
and Furman and should guide its decision.88 In applying the "nature 
of the offense" test the panel majority concluded that, while Rum­
mel's crimes were felonies under Texas law, they lacked the indicia 
of depravity associated with felonies. 89 The panel opinion pointed 
out that all of Rummel's offenses essentially were nonviolent, prop­
erty offenses.9O 
The panel next evaluated the legislative objective behind the 
Texas recidivist statute to determine whether its intent was fulfilled 
by sentencing Rummel to life imprisonment. The panel majority 
concluded that the legislative purpose behind the Texas statute was 
to protect Texas citizens from incorrigible repeat offenders.91 While 
Rummel's offenses required punishment, the court seriously ques­
tioned whether Rummel's crimes were of such gravity to mandate 
the imposition of society'S harshest penalty short of death.92 In com­
paring Rummel's sentence with punishments levied under Texas law 
for other crimes and with sentences imposed in other jurisdictions 
for offenses similar to that of Rummel's, the court concluded that 
there was a gross disproportionality between Rummel's crime and 
his sentence.93 The panel majority also noted that it would not con­
sider Rummel's possibility of parole as relevant to an eighth amend­
ment determination.94 The grant or denial of parole by a state, in 
the absence of some unusual circumstances, is not reviewable by a 
federal court.95 If the federal court were to consider good time credit 
as relevant to eighth amendment scrutiny, it then would be forced to 
86. 568 F.2d at 1199-200. 
87. Id. at 1200; see text accompanying note 80 supra. 
88. 568 F.2d at 1197. 




93. Id. at 1199. 
94. Id. at 1196. 
95. Id. 
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become more involved in the state parole process.96 
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en bane, agreed with the panel opinion 
that some criminal sentences could be so disproportionate as to 
amount to cruel and unusual punishment under the eighth amend­
ment.97 The court, however, held that Rummel's life sentence was 
not so disproportionate as to violate the eighth amendment. 98 The en 
bane majority, while accepting the panel's use of three of the four 
Hart criteria,99 stated that the panel erred by looking to the underly­
ing offenses of Rummel to establish the asserted triviality of those 
offenses for the "nature of the offense" test. lOO The court stated that 
Rummel was being sentenced as an habitual criminal who, by past 
behavior, had demonstrated an inability to conform to the rules of 
society. That was the offense that should be evaluated.101 The court 
also held that, for a realistic assessment of Rummel's sentence, it was 
necessary to consider his eligibility for parole. 102 
The Supreme Court upheld Rummel's life sentence in a five-to­
four decision. Unlike the lower courts' opinions, however, the 
Supreme Court did not overtly apply a proportionality approach to 
evaluate the length of Rummel's sentence. The majority, in an opin­
ion written by Justice Rehnquist, initially distinguished Weems and 
the death penalty cases from Rummel because of the unique nature 
of the punishments involved.103 Justice Rehnquist's majority opin­
ion also noted that the presence or absence of violence is not relevant 
to the legislative determination of length of sentence and does not 
always affect the strength of society's interest. 104 
To support the rejection of Rummel's eighth amendment claim, 
the majority opinion cited Graham v. West Virginia .105 Graham was 
an incorrigible thief who was convicted three times for stealing hor­
96. Id. See generally Comment, Rights of the Convicted Felon on Parole, 13 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 367 (1979). 
97. 587 F.2d at 655. 
98. Id. at 662. 
99. The court would not accept the "necessity" test, as presented in Justice Bren­
nan's concurring opinion in Furman. Id. at 661. 
100. Id. at 659. 
101. Id. But see Comment, Recidivism and the Eighth Amendment-Is The Habit­
ual Offender Protected Against Excessive Punishment?, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 305 (1979). 
102. 587 F.2d at 657. 
103. This is not to say that a proportionality analysis would not come into play in 
extreme circumstances. 445 U.S. at 274 n.ll. 
104. Id. at 274. The extreme punishnient involved in Weems and the unique na­
ture of the death penalty were seen as significant factors making any analogy between 
those cases and the case at bar improper. Id. 
105. Id. at 275. See also Katkin, supra note 21. 
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ses.106 Graham was sentenced to a mandatory life sentence under 
the West Virginia recidivist statute. 107 The judgment was affirmed 
by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. lOS The majority 
noted that Graham was decided only two years after Weems and was 
indistinguishable from the case at bar.109 
Justice Rehnquist's opinion also agreed with the court of ap­
peals, concluding that Rummel's possibility of parole was a relevant 
consideration. 110 Justice Rehnquist reached this conclusion because 
parole is an established consideration of imprisonment of convicted 
criminals, and a proper assessment of Texas' treatment of Rummel 
could not ignore the possibility that Rummel may not actually be 
imprisoned for the remainder of his life. III 
Three Justices joined a dissent written by Justice Powell. I 12 The 
dissent concluded that a proportionality analysis was applicable to 
the evaluation of Rummel's sentence. I 13 The dissent reached its de­
termination by tracing the evolution of the eighth amendment as ap­
plied in Weems, Robinson, Furman, and Coker.l l4 Once the dissent 
determined that a proportionality analysis was applicable, it deline­
ated three of the four factors in Hart to measure the constitutionality 
of Rummel's sentence. I IS In the dissent's application of the "nature 
of the offense" test it was noted that each of Rummel's crimes in­
volved nothing more than the use of fraud to obtain sums of money 
totaling $230. 116 The nonviolence of Rummel's offenses also was a 
major factor considered by the dissenting Justices. 117 
Justice Powell's dissent then compared, hypothetically, Rum­
mel's treatment under the Texas statute with treatment in other juris­
dictions under identical factual circumstances. I IS The comparison 
resulted in a conclusion that Rummel's treatment in Texas is an ab­
erration from the punishments he would receive in other jurisdic­
106. 224 U.s. 616 (1912). 
107. Id. at 620-21. 
108. £d. at 621-22. 
109. Id. 
110. 445 U.S. at 276-77. 
111. £d. at 280-81. 
112. Id. See also Comment, supra note 96. 
113. 445 U.S. at 285 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall & Ste­
vens, JJ.). 
114. Id. at 293-95. 
115. Id. at 289-93; see Mulligan, supra note 78. 
116. Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1973), cerl. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974). 
117. 445 U.S. at 295. 
118. Id. 
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tions. 119 The dissent also examined Rummel's punishment in 
comparison to Texas' treatment of two-time felony offenders, noting 
that the severity of the offense has an effect on the length of sentence 
for the dual offender, but that all three-time felony offenders under 
Texas law are given the same sentence without consideration given 
to the gravity of the crime. 120 After examining the above factors, the 
dissent concluded that Rummel suffered a cruel and unusual punish­
ment in violation of the eighth amendment. 121 
The dissent also disagreed with Justice Rehnquist's considera­
tion of Rummel's possibility of parole as relevant to an eighth 
amendment determination of the constitutionality of his life sen­
tence. 122 Rummel has no enforceable right to parole, and parole re­
mains a matter of executive grace. 123 The dissent, therefore, 
determined that an approach that weighed the possibility of parole 
in eighth amendment analysis was both unfair and inconsistent with 
the amendment itself.124 
IV. COMMENTS 
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Rummel vacillated on 
the issue of the applicability of a proportionality analysis in examin­
ing the mere length of a sentence. 125 In a footnote, however, it was 
acknowledged that in certain extreme circumstances a proportional­
ity analysis would be applied to evaluate the constitutionality of the 
length of a sentence. 126 The majority also recognized Rummel's pos­
sibility of parole as a relevant factor in eighth amendment scru­
tiny. 127 This recognition could be construed as a form of 
proportionality analysis. 128 The majority expressly refused to evalu­
ate Rummel's sentence under a strict proportionality analysis. In ef­
fect, however, the Justices may have agreed to consider Rummel's 
possibility of parole and may have determined that he actually was 
119. Id. This is in line with the factual evaluation that took place in Robinson, 370 
U.S. at 667. See text accompanying notes 50-53 supra. 
120. 445 U.S. at 296-97. 
121. Id. at 300. The majority pointed out that both Washington and West Virginia 
have similiar penalogical schemes. Id. at 296-97. 
122. Id. at 300-02. 
123. Id. at 307. 
124. Id. at 293-94. 
125. Id. at 293. 
126. Id. at 294. 
127. See text accompanying notes 102-12 supra. 
128. "This is not to say that a proportionality principle would not come into play 
in the extreme example mentioned by the dissent, . . .if a legislature made overtime 
parking a felony punishable by life imprisonment." 445 U.s. at 274 n.ll. 
348 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:335 
getting something less than a life sentence and, therefore, was not 
unconstitutionally incarcerated. While the majority opinion does 
not give any indication of the weight to be given to the possibility of 
parole, mere recognition of this aspect indicates the existence of 
some degree of sentence evaluation. 129 
In refusing to explicitly examine Rummel's sentence, the Court 
gave great deference to the Texas legislature. l3O Indeed, it may be 
proper to leave difficult penological judgments to legislatures rather 
than to the courts. The problem after Rummel, however, is to deter­
mine when a court should apply the proportionality analysis to de­
termine the constitutionality of a criminal sentence. 
There is no guidance from Justice Rehnquist,'s opinion regard­
ing what cases are sufficiently extreme, in the judgment of the Court, 
to require a proportionality analysis. While the majority agreed that 
a statute that levies a mandatory life sentence for overtime parking is 
sufficiently extreme to merit such scrutiny, 13l there is no indication 
where the line is to be drawn or why Rummel's case is not suffi­
ciently compelling. 132 
Indeed, the case law seems to justify a proportionality analysis, 
regardless of whether capital or barbarous forms of punishment are 
involved. 133 In order to solve the eighth amendment issue in Weems, 
the Court chose to measure the relationship between the punishment 
and the offense and compared the punishment to other punishments 
for more serious offenses. 134 In Robinson, the Court used a propor­
tionality approach in a noncapital case to find a violation of the 
eighth and fourteenth amendments when California punished those 
with the mere status of narcotic addiction. 135 The most compelling 
authority dictating application of proportionality is Coker, in which 
the Court used a pure proportionality approach in holding the death 
penalty unconstitutional when applied to an individual who raped 
an adult woman. 136 The majority opinion, however, distinguished 
the cases involving capital punishment and barbarous forms of pun­
129. Id. at 280-81. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. at 283-85. 
132. See note 128 JUpro. 
133. One reason the Court did not find Rummel's claim especially compelling was 
its recognition of Texas' strong interest in punishing the habitual offender. 445 U.S. at 
276. 
134. Id. at 293 (Powell, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, 
JJ.). 
135. 217 U.S. at 380-81. 
136. 370 U.S. at 667. 
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ishment as factually different. 137 
The Rummel dissent pointed out that no basis exists for the ma­
jority's suggestion that the Coker analysis applies only to capital 
cases. 138 While the death penalty is unique, it is not the only form of 
punishment that can be administered in a cruel and unusual manner, 
as Weems, Robinson, and Trop have established. In addition, Gra­
ham is not strong authority for refusing to approve a proportionality 
analysis because, under the eighth amendment, the individual cir­
cumstances must be examined for a determination of constitutional­
ity.139 Pursuant to Trop and Furman, the eighth amendment is to be 
measured according to evolving standards of decency. Citation to a 
fifty-year-old horse theft case as authority against the applicability of 
a proportionality analysis to evaluate Rummel's sentence is ques­
tionable when the eighth amendment is to be construed in a flexible 
manner and in relation to contemporary societal values. 
The dissenting opinion in Rummel applied the proportionality 
analysis to Rummel's sentence and evaluated the sentence pursuant 
to three of the four Hart criteria. 140 The dissent was consistent with 
prior case law in concluding that a proportionality analysis was ap­
plied properly in the case. Although there is no holding that applies 
eighth amendment proportionality to evaluate the length of a crimi­
nal sentence, the application of a proportionality analysis to Rummel 
should have been a logical extension of preceding case law. The use 
of objective criteria, as delineated in Hart and in the Rummel dis­
sent, may prevent eighth amendment scrutiny from becoming simply 
the subjective opinions of individual Justices. Prior, consistent use 
of a proportionality analysis plus the use of appropriate objective 
criticism suggest that the dissenting opinion analytically is more 
acceptable. 
There also are significant problems of interpretation with the 
majority opinion. There are at least three possible alternative hold­
ings that are ascertainable and feasible. Justice Rehnquist implied 
that legislatures deserve the utmost deference in sentencing policies 
and therefore length of sentence alone will not be evaluated under 
an eighth amendment proportionality analysis. In the concluding 
paragraphs of the majority opinion, Rehnquist explicitly pointed out 
that drawing lines for sentencing practices largely are legislative du­
137. 433 U.S. at 592. 
138. 445 U.S. at 274-75. 
139. Id. at 292-93. 
140. 370 U.S. at 667. 
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ties. 141 If this approach, however, is adhered to the majority's dis­
cussion of parole and the role of prosecutorial discretion was not 
necessary and cannot be rationalized. 142 There also remains the rare 
situation when, according to Justice Rehnquist's footnote, extreme 
circumstances necessitate eighth amendment scrutiny.143 Under a 
pure deferential approach, future courts will never reach the issue of 
the proportionality of a sentence in Rummel-like factual situations. 
Another interpretation of Justice Rehnquist's opinion is that the 
issues involved in sentencing determinations are too complex to be 
decided through objective criteria like those applied in Hart and 
Carmona. This reading would explain Justice Rehnquist's failure to 
apply a Hart-like approach and his reluctance to give tangible 
weight to any salient factors such as the possibility of parole. This 
approach ultimately would either leave the task of sentencing to the 
state legislatures and obviate eighth amendment scrutiny or, even 
worse, allow for such scrutiny to continue unguided. If, in the fu­
ture, courts are faced with a factual situation comparable to Rummel, 
their only recourse will be to balance the criteria noted in the major­
ity opinion and evaluate the sentence in accordance with their own 
principles of equity and fairness. 
A third reading of Justice Rehnquist's opinion may lead to the 
conclusion that a proportionality analysis actually was used despite 
Justice Rehnquist's denial of its applicability. Evidence of this possi­
ble conclusion is present in Justice Rehnquist's evaluation of the 
Texas recidivist statute as compared to other state statutes and his 
indication of the lack of significant differences. l44 The majority's 
consideration of Rummel's possibility of parole, as well as the strong 
state interest in dealing with habitual offenders, are evidence of a 
balancing test and an evaluation of the propriety of Rummel's sen­
tence. In light of this, courts may proceed with a proportionality 
analysis to evaluate the length of a sentence and will have the use of 
objective criteria for making such determinations. 
The effect of Rummel depends upon which interpretation is ap­
plied. A larger question, however, remains: What is the propriety of 
a judicial inquiry into legislated sentencing requirements? The Rum­
mel majority felt that the use of objective criteria was improper 
when dealing with eighth amendment issues and, because of this 
141. 445 U.S. at 284-85. 
142. Id. at 280-81. 
143. Id. at 274 n.ll; see note 128 supra and accompanying text. 
144. 445 U.S. at 279. 
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conclusion, the Court proceeded carefully into the legislative sphere. 
The circuit court decisions in Hart and Carl1Jona and Justice Pow­
ell's dissent in Rummel established objective criteria that were used 
to evaluate the proportionality of a sentence pursuant to the eighth 
amendment. These criteria better prepare courts to deal with the is­
sues in this difficult area. The presence of judicial standards does 
not assure removal of subjective judicial bias in eighth amendment 
determinations. Such standards, however, do provide the courts 
with necessary guidelines with which to construe the concept of 
eighth amendment proportionality with appropriate fairness and 
equity. 
v. CONCLUSION 
William Rummel, upon conviction of his third felony offense, 
was sentenced to life imprisonment under the Texas recidivist stat­
ute. In Rummel v. Estelle, 145 Rummel challenged his life sentence 
under the eighth amendment, attempting to obtain a determination 
that his sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate to the se­
verity of his offenses. The Court, however, did not allow Rummel's 
claim. 
While the concept of proportionality is heavily embedded in 
eighth amendment analysis, the Supreme Court, unlike the lower 
courts, refused to expressly apply a proportionality analysis to evalu­
ate Rummel's sentence. The Court arrived at this conclusion by dist­
inguishing Weems and the death penalty cases and by focusing on 
the unique nature of the punishments that were involved. The Court 
decided that there had been no Supreme Court case that extended 
proportionality solely to evaluate the length of a criminal sentence. 
Recent case law, however, indicates that application of propor­
tionality to evaluate the length of a sentence may be a necessary and 
proper extension of eighth amendment scrutiny. Decisions such as 
Weems, Robinson, and Coker are sufficient proof that proportional­
ity has been applied to a variety of factual circumstances and that 
there is no salient reason for the Court's failure to expressly apply a 
proportionality analysis in evaluating Rummel's life sentence. 
Indeed, from Justice Rehnquist's opinion, there are at least 
three possible alternative interpretations. Justice Rehnquist implied 
that a decision regarding the mere length of a criminal sentence is 
best left to legislative discretion. According to this deferential read­
145. Id. at 263. 
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ing, future courts will never reach the issue of whether a sentence 
would survive a proportionality analysis. 
Another reading of Justice Rehnquist's opinion may be that the 
issues involved in evaluation of a criminal sentence are too complex 
to be analyzed according to objective criteria. This explains the ma­
jority's refusal to apply a Hart-like approach to evaluate Rummel's 
sentence. This interpretation allows courts to go forward and ana­
lyze future Rummel-like situations by balancing the criteria noted in 
the majority opinion. 
A third reading of the majority opinion may be that a propor­
tionality analysis actually took place, in that various criteria were 
balanced to decide the propriety of Rummel's sentence. Under this 
perspective, courts may proceed, with the weight of precedent, to 
make eighth amendment evaluations of the length of a sentence with 
the use of a proportionality analysis. The effect ofRummel depends 
upon which of the above interpretations will be followed by the 
courts. 
Herbert J. Shepardson 
